A brief anthropology of family

Zwięzła antropologia rodziny

Abstract:

This article intends to think the concrete reality of the family from the perspective of a philosophical anthropology, based on the biblical-Christian hermeneutic model. At the same time, starting from this particular anthropology, it suggests a general anthropology according to a family matrix. This anthropology is understood as relation of different persons, based on the model of donation. The concrete mode of its accomplishment occurs in family relations, like filiation, fraternity, conjugality and parenthood.

Keywords:

family; anthropology; gift; difference; relation.

Abstrakt:


Słowa kluczowe:

rodzina; antropologia; dar; różnica; relacja.
I see here *anthropology* as an interpretation of the human that allows framing their practices in an orientation of meaning. Therefore my point of view is not limited to the description of various pragmatics, without regarding their suitability to what is considered to be properly human. I place myself insofar at the philosophical level of a hermeneutics of meaning, in this case applied to what we consider to be humanity.

I also recognize, so that the assumptions of hermeneutics concerned are clear, that the proposed anthropology is based on a biblical-Christian interpretation of reality, specially of human reality. And the first element of this reading is the consideration of the personal human as relationship of differences. Within a tendentiously unifying and standardizing horizon – based on the hermeneutics of the undetermined and primordial one – the biblical world contrasts difference as the original constituent of creation (cf. Beauchamp 1969). This difference assumes personal characteristics in the constitution of the human, while based on the uniqueness and individuality of each human person. At the same time, precisely because it is an irreducible difference, it can only be thought of as relational. Thus, each human person is based on the relational constitution of his difference, which is precisely the basis of personal identity.

The purpose of this article is to analyse the role of the family in the range of relationships that constitute personal identities, as insurmountable differences. Therefore it is about examining family relationships as the core of the constitution of the human, in other words, about the basis of an anthropology. We shall leave aside other possible approaches to the roles of the family: both a strictly biological perspective and a social or institutional perspective, or regarding the classification of the transmission of assets or of other factors, even though all these elements can be very important for the basic understanding of this institution. Accordingly, while it outlines an anthropology of the family, we will finally present a general anthropology based on a family relational model.

1. Donation

Before dealing with the concrete anthropology of family relationships, it is appropriate to contextualize, from the general and theoretical point of view, the phenomenological basis of these relationships. I believe that this contextualization can be condensed in the exploration of the category of the *gift*, as a determinant of certain understanding of reality. I do not intend to address here the meaning of the strictly phenomenological notion of *donation* as the basis of a kind of fundamental ontology. It is enough to point at some of the major in-
sights of this phenomenological development to see their importance for what we consider an anthropology of relationship. In this field it is particularly important to distinguish between relationships based on gift, and those based on other modalities.

Paul Ricœur, for example, distinguishes the “gift economy” of the pure application of the “golden rule” in interpersonal relationships (cf. Ricœur 1996; Ricœur 1994, 273–279). This “rule” constitutes the most universal and obvious way of ethical reasoning: \textit{do what you want to be done to you} and \textit{do not do what you don’t want to be done to you}. It is based on reciprocity as a condition, and therefore, on some kind of individual interest, so that it may be extended to the formulation: “do, \textit{so that it will be done to you}” and “do not do, \textit{so that it won’t be done to you}”: Insofar it follows the traditional formula of an all-interested and rentable relationship: \textit{do ut des}. Now the gift economy corresponds to a modality of action – and relationship – that overcomes this profitable dynamism and is based on a kind of non-justification of the gift: I give for nothing and don’t expect anything in return. Reciprocity, therefore, does not play a role here.

Jacques Derrida, in turn, when speaking of the quality of the gift, counteracts precisely economy as a relationship based on reciprocity, i.e., always already determined by interest or by profitability (cf. Derrida 1991). In this radical contrast, the gift is defined precisely by its historical impossibility, in such a way that any realization – implying a donor, a receiver and something given – would reduce the gift to the horizon of economy, insofar to reciprocal and profitable exchange. The gift is only possible insofar as it absolutely cannot be given and, accordingly, lives of the not-life of its excess, without historical incarnation.

Jean-Luc Marion, in turn, approaches the category of gift also to that impossibility, insofar he thinks it as an excess, either in relation to the self or in reference to the hermeneutic horizon of its own interpretation. But he thinks the impossibility of giving something differently from Derrida. If it is true that he also intends to overcome all reduction of the donation to the economic exchange, which would make the gift a not-gift (cf. Marion 1987, 1989, 2003). Insofar he approaches Derrida when he argues that the “gift requires some non-appearance or non-phenomenality” (Caputo 1999, 66). However, he does not reach this claim immediately, right from the start, from a radical deconstruction. His route is the one of the phenomenological reduction, which starts with the phenomenal reality of the gift or of the donation, given in every gift, in an exchange process between a donor and a receiver, by reference to something that is given. From this basis, he works his \textit{giveness (donneitité, Gegebenheit)}, until he reaches the donation \textit{itself}. Well, it is at the level of this donation reduced to itself that Marion notes the donation to be independent of any donor or receiver, even of any objectively
given gift. In this sense, the donation, to be such, cannot appear as a phenomenon among phenomena, but as a result of phenomenological reduction that understands it from other phenomena.

However, the phenomena leading us more easily to donation as a non-phenomenon are the “saturated phenomena” (cf. Marion 1987, 2001). This phenomena harbour themselves an excess of giving, becoming a hyper-donation or a hyper-appearance. Thus, it is not the immediate perception of the impossibility of giving, by the dynamics of desire, but rather the perception mediated by the phenomenal saturation of given reality that allows us to access – to believe – the mystery of donation itself, as primordial mystery of all that is, being beyond being or without being.

In all these readings we find a common denominator: the excessive size of the relationship according to the gift, which breaks the strict dynamism of reciprocity and of profitability. In all these readings, however, there is a tendency to assume such a transcendence of the category of gift, that does not allow its really historical experience, within the concrete relations between real human beings always already subordinated to the dynamism of economy and therefore, at most practitioners of the golden rule.

It is true that the majority of human relationships is marked by this limitation, considering that social harmony is always determined by a commitment to the best possible organization, but which always falls short of an ideal gift. “Politics”, according to Ricœur, would be originated precisely from this process of a permanent possible commitment and in better balance of individual interests (cf. Ricœur 1986, 403). The dynamism of the gift would always be beyond this real possibility. Ricœur – more evidently than Derrida or even than Marion, though partly in the sense of both – admits the need for reference to the size of the gift as “regulative idea” or eschatological catalyst. Nevertheless the fact is that, for concrete historical achievements, the excess of that category never allows real full realization.

But even assuming some reason of the reading proposed by the three French philosophers, it seems to me that this radical negativity of the gift may be questioned. I propose to recognize a possibility of incarnation of its excess, without losing its excessive nature. It’s what can be said generally about the category of love, thought of as mercy or agape. Following the question pertinently posed by John Milbank – “can a gift be given?” (Milbank 1995) – I would respond positively, although with the reservation that the giving of this gift implies the historical eruption of an excessive size in relation to all historical processes and excessive in relation also to the subjects of history. But it is actually an eruption given, and therefore possible; i.e., its excess cannot be identified with an impossibility –
which would always keep it in this impossibility – but with the critical rupture 
with other modalities of relation, produced exclusively by the immanence of hu-
man beings.

For my part, I advance the thesis that the possibility of the historical realiza-
tion of this excess occurs, though not exclusively, especially in family relation-
ships. Incidentally, the similar relationships, outside the strict scope of family, 
are in large part analogue to the family relationships. However, typically fami-
ly relationships – which constitute the human as such, but specifically through 
a relational mode that exceeds him – are not undefined relationships, only de-
termined by the generic category of the gift. Those are typical relations in which 
the dynamism of the free gift is articulated always in a different way. They are 
different relationships and relational differences, that will lead us to a very char-
acteristic general anthropology, as we shall see.

2. Relationships

2.1. Filiation

Michel Henry, in one of his most publicized works (cf. Henry 2003), gives 
a chapter the symptomatic title: “Forgetting the condition of son”. This forget-
ting corresponds to the birth of the “transcendental illusion of the ego, which 
is to be taken as the basis of his being” (Henry 2003, 140). Thus it becomes clear 
what conversely the condition of son would mean. In contrast, the refusal of 
this condition means that the “ego regards as his achievement this being him-
self, this Self, as if the ‘me’ were coming just from himself and would refer just 
to himself” (Henry 2003, 140). Accordingly, filiation implies recognition of the 
otherness of the origin.

This reading of Henry can inspire the reconsideration of that primordial 
human relationship, as a fundamental constituent of his human identity. It is, 
therefore, the first important datum of anthropology. It is true that Henry refers 
to this condition by a relation to the otherness of Life, which ultimately finds its 
truth in reference to God, considering that this was the position of Christianity. 
In his words “man is only a man insofar as he is a Son, a Son of Life, that is, of 
God” (Henry 2003, 134). I do not discuss here the correctness of this statement, 
all because I assume the Christian basis of my proposal of anthropology. I just 
don’t agree with the dialectic and radical conclusion that the French phenome-
nologist takes from this fundamental statement, opposing nature and super na-
ture (even if understood phenomenologically). According to him “Christ seems
to contrast himself with people understood as natural beings. The natural filiation that is appropriated to them and that situates them in the world’s time, according to the order of genealogies ... is abruptly broken off and rejected by Christ ...” (Henry 2003, 129).

As it is known, the contrast between nature and super nature – between natural filiation and Arch-filiation, to take in Henry’s nomenclature – doesn’t need to be taken in that way. Furthermore, the very Christian tradition enables the interpretation of natural filiation as realization and revelation of the Arch-filiation, which makes it necessary, though not absolute.

Thus, it seems possible to apply the intuition of the phenomenology of Henry to that relationship that primarily defines our human condition, regardless of the level that one applies to this relationship. To be a son is to recognize not to be an absolute principle of himself, but the gift of another. It is certain that this recognition is accomplished in numerous ways, as a way of being and a state of mind. But it is also true that the filiation held specifically in the family – which results from the relation to concrete parents and, for these, to the previous generations – belongs, even because of its biological roots, to the basic construction of identities. In principle, it is in the family where we learn – or not – to be a son (a daughter), in every way. There is, therefore, a close relation between the family relationship and this original condition of mankind, where conscience and experience emerges from this condition, as actually lived.

This concrete relation to parents – and, by extension, to grandparents – is always bodily constituted, in reference to those concrete parents and those concrete grandparents. Accordingly this is also the place of incorporation of the relation of the human to the body and, in it, to space and time. The spatial conditions – and limits – of human existence are experienced on the limitation of the relationship between one’s own body and the body of another; in this case, by the limitation of the relation to the parent’s body, to the origin. This restriction happens in a family by the relation to the home as the place of other relations. The home as a place, in conjunction with other places and because of its status of housing real people and with real family relationships, allows the first experience of the spatiality of the human body (cf. Lacroix 2001).

Similarly, not only for the relation to changes in own body, but specially for the relation to body transformation of others – specially grandparents, through aging – one develops the experience of time and temporality of the human, also its transience, on the path of death. The experience of mortal human condition is a fundamental experience, which is being increasingly accepted as “normal”. Learning space, time and, with it, death – in the old tradition of the ars moriendi – is one of the most important functions of the familiar anthropological dynamism.
2.2. Fraternity

The topic of fraternity has been undoubtedly one of those, which have most excited the history of the West culture, just to mention the centrality it occupies in the “theory” of the French Revolution. But it is undoubtedly one of the notions, which finds more difficulties in the social realization of any anthropological ideal. First of all, the fraternal relationship implies a relationship of equals, but is not guided by agreements, regulations or contracts. It is a relationship “naturally” free, i.e., without conditions nor interests. One loves his brother just because he is brother.

The gratuity of this relationship between equals – and therefore it is not relation of origin (originating or originated) – has a fundamental condition and an inevitable consequence in order to be a true fraternity relationship. The condition refers to the common origin. Brothers are children of the same parents, even if that parenting is metaphorical – children of the same people, of the same situation, etc. Thus, the first condition of the fraternity relationship is sharing the parental relationship. That is why humans can only be considered brothers when they are assumed as children (son and daughter).

The consequence refers to the way that responsibility accompanies fraternity. This, in fact, implies a different way of liability from the mere responsibility for myself (for my own actions, for example). The fraternity always involves responsibility for the other, precisely for the brother. An original narrative of this relationship is the biblical story of Cain and Abel. And the fundamental anthropological question is always “Where is your brother?”, not exactly “What did you do?”. The fraternity felt there is when the brother “feels” (more than he knows and more than he should) responsible for his brother. This responsibility is independent of the responsibility for myself and regardless of all conditions or merits. Regardless of my action, I take the “blame” for my brother; regardless of his action, I assume his own forgiveness. This profound – and even paradoxical – degree of responsibility goes into the replacement, in which I assume the place of my brother, to take the consequences of his own action (cf. Levinas 1974, 179ff).

Well, although the fraternity relationship felt as “natural” – a brother does not ask why – it is certain that it is the most difficult and paradoxical in the human existence. So, that “naturalness” does not replace the need for practical learning. And it finds its first context precisely in the relationship between blood brothers, who share the same family origin. That’s why the fraternal relationship, as family relationship, is anthropologically foundational, as the basis of social and universal fraternity.
2.3. Conjugality

Starting from the fraternity relationship that animates all humans, men and women, regardless of other determinations of their relational identity, there is a way of relationship that, not abandoning the level of fraternity, deepens other levels. I speak about the relationship between man and woman, as realization of the respective sexuality. This relationship is in the basis of what we can call conjugality and that, somehow, constitutes the origin of family. In fact it is from the practical realization of this conjugality that a man and a woman give birth to a new family. Within this specific type of relationship, it is necessary to consider, first of all, the much-discussed relation between nature and culture. Even though it may be much discussed today, I begin with a basic assumption: cultures and individuals cannot dispose and transform arbitrary and subjectively data of fundamental understanding of human beings. Only thus one safeguards what defines the human, in its basic dignity, not being the product of itself, neither as a subject nor as a society, but transcendentally originated (regardless of the interpretation of what this transcendence might mean). Therefore, in respect to the most fundamental elements, no subject and no culture can change the basic ethical “imperatives”.

This ethical determinant of human “nature” is the most fundamental, and it would not be, for example, the rationalist interpretation of the human being, like the Stoics understood it, or its sociologist interpretation, as predominantly the modern was. Thus, this “natural” determinant implies and challenges the human being in its integrity, not putting certain “parts” of himself against other “parts”, supposedly destructors or “unnatural”. 

Based on this integral notion of human being, as a criterion that is articulated in the definition of his “nature” like a personal being as unique body with spiritual dimension – and as unique spirit, with body dimension – we can say that a certain sexual anthropology is based on a vision of the human “nature”; and we can say that this vision is given to it and not invented or constructed by each subject or each culture – even if, in its concrete realization, the history of the subject and the brand of culture are central to the construction and the discovery of identity.

This is not, admittedly, a “nature” understood simply biologically. In fact, being a human person is naturally cultural. But it is also assumed that the biological dimension of human “nature” is not a secondary element, simply culturally or subjectively manageable. To take the body seriously – even in its dimension of “flesh” – implies taking seriously its biological constitution and the meaning of its contribution to personal identity, to interpersonal relationships and
to the resulting cultures. On the other hand, to take the notion of “nature”, in this broader sense, implies accepting the human person as a “sacred” being, i.e., untouchable in its dignity, not available, neither to others nor to himself, nor to the most diverse systems.

Well, relationality, source of society, is the way to realize the fullness of the human “nature”, as personal “nature”. And the core of relationality is the difference. As such, the difference is the fundamental premise, so that anthropology can conceive the human person as being essentially relational. Among all the possible differences – which are immense – stands out, as basic, the difference between man and woman. In this sense, the hermeneutics of the human always presupposes concrete humanity as man or as woman. This always means and cannot be forgotten that humanity happens as relationship between man and woman; this relationship, on one hand, implies the two ways of being-human and, on the other, is implied by them. No one is human without being, in absolute alternative, as man or as woman, in the relationship involved there – which gives the fullness of every human to each way of being, but, at the same time, prevents the absolutism of each one of these ways. I.e., no one is absolutely human being “just” a man or “just” a woman. Not that each is only a part or half human – how certain Platonic conception of love wants, as a result of the division of the human into two parts. But because each one is fully – and equally – human, being it in its difference and therefore in its relation to another different: man in relation to the woman, and woman in relation to man. To ignore this fundamental relationship would be a way of completely perverting the notion of the human person and its practical realization. “Even though what counts as male or female is conditioned by the respective culture and society, remains the biological difference between man and woman and the division of ‘tasks’ that results; and this difference points, in turn, to a polarity in the personal dimension ... It is this polarity that precedes and underlies all possible variations and brands fundamentally the human being” (Splett 1996, 43).

It should be noted that this perspective is far from a defence of a gender-dualism. Firstly, because it doesn’t propose any dualism but a relational difference, which is radically different. In this sense, I distance myself clearly from the interpretation proposed by Donna Haraway. She accuses this dualism of being the source of all conflicts and proposes to overcome them (cf. Haraway 1991). I mean, on the contrary, that the relationship between man and woman is not dualistic but differential. Thus, it is not a source of conflict but the possibility of being human. Secondly, because my perspective does not refer specifically to gender difference (male and female) but to sexual difference between man and woman as the bodily basis of anthropological relationship.
From this radical relationality, which presupposes the relation and the difference in the origin of each concrete person – and of the societies that are organized as well – we can understand a reading of human existence in terms of what we ambiguously call love. If personal identity results from a primordial relation to the different, the meaning of this identity cannot be but the gift of oneself to the other, as the fullness of inter-human relationship. Love goes on to define the core of humanity, so the respective anthropology. And it is love understood in its complex multidimensionality. To the universal fraternity, while filiation or friendship without borders – even for “enemies”, that is, more different than the different, which seem to have nothing in common – joins the relationship that values eros or desire, which attracts certain people, specially the specific sexual desire that draws man and woman.

However, the desire is not an absolute in itself and therefore remains ambiguous in its orientation. Thus, the criterion of anthropologically correct desire becomes another dimension of love, agape, which basically means the ability to give the own life for another, to understand the meaning of existence as a free gift of life, according to the modality of the gift. Thus, the primary desire of the human person must be the “welfare” of the other – so he loves him, wanting him to that extent only – and not as a selfish function of the self. Love is thus the correct congregation of friendship with eroticism and the giving of oneself, all in the same movement that excludes oppositions between these dimensions. Sexuality finds its privileged place there, thus taking its “sacred” and religious dimension – until its sacramentality, by the Christian concept of marriage – although remaining perfectly human and profane.

2.4. Maternity / Paternity

Even though humans are beings from others (filiation) and beings with others (fraternity and conjugality), this still does not complete its way of being. In this sense, an anthropology of the origin and an anthropology of the alliance would still not be enough; because fertility is also an essential element of the human. For some cultures it is even its distinctive dimension. In this sense, being-from-another and being-with-others is headed, of course, for the being-for-others. And this full size, a sign of human maturity, finds in the pragmatic of the being-so-that-the-other-can-be its paramount achievement. Thus, fertility, either in direct biological effect or in derived senses, is the expression of the human purpose.

Without going into exaggerated details, that could lead us to certain artificiality, it seems to me obvious that this dimension of human fertility takes on motherhood and fatherhood its own achievement. In a very simple and even
superficial way, one might consider that motherhood implies a strong continuity between who generates and who is generated. It emphasizes the co-ownership of both and even the similarity, and emphasizes a kind of natural symbiotic relation between the given and the received (being). Fatherhood, in turn, develops more explicitly the difference between who gives and who receives, making the relation of the gift of the other being as an institution of an irreducible difference.

This statement of the difference allows, at the same time, to think whether motherhood or fatherhood as personal relationships, rather than as strictly biological relationships. These, of course, cannot be completely bypassed or ignored. But the way of relationship established by fertility is deeper and is only specifically human when it reaches the depth of the free relationship.

It is in this sense that Paul Ricoeur talks about fatherhood as naming (cf. Ricoeur 1969, 458–486; Duque 2004, 222ff), which allows the passage to the symbolic dimension of fatherhood, beyond its phantasmal dimension. In fact, a certain phantasm of parenthood can lead to the castration of the son, nullifying his freedom, by imposition of authority; another phantasm may lead to the same, by exaggerated paternalism or maternalism. Therefore, the phantasms of fatherhood and motherhood, metaphorically condensed in the Oedipus complex, become only compatible with human dignity when they are overcome in the symbol of both. And this overshoot is caused by the free linguistic recognition. So, being a child – and being a parent – is not a pure event of nature. Without ceasing to be, it is always already an event of interpersonal and linguistic relationship, which implies the free acceptance of being originated and of being the origin.

This kind of relation – as the origin of the different other – can mark several areas of human relations. However its original mode takes place in family and is also pedagogically in the family that one learns to be mother and father, in order to understand the own existence as existence for others to be, in permanent fertility of the being.

3. Aperture

A reflection on the human, as being of family relationships, has led us to an anthropology of the family. This will allow us, finally, to throw some topics of a general (philosophical) anthropology; i.e., the characteristics of the human, as developed in family relationships, can be thought of and applied to all the modalities of relationships, albeit in a derivative or almost metaphorical way, thus
contributing to a general anthropology according to a family matrix. In this anthropology, family relationships serve therefore as a model, not only theoretical but also pragmatic, to any kind of relationship. And it serves also as the model of society itself, as a network of personal relations, more or less organized into complex structures. Here, I confine myself to a brief presentation of two topics.

1. An anthropology according to family matrix is based on three categories, all necessarily related, owing its very existence to the mutual interpenetration: I mean the categories of difference, relation and donation.

Regarding the first, it should be remembered that an anthropology based on (personal) difference is irreducible to any anthropology that annuls the individuality of each personal being in a general and abstract overview, as total energy or as indefinite overriding principle. Every personal being is not just a single exemplar of the generic human – or cosmic – neither just the appearance of it, that is diversified in its manifestation. Every personal being is unique and unrepeatable, as the core of freedom.

Now this real and unavoidable difference is only possible through relation. In fact nothing is different from anything unless in relation to the different. Therefore, the difference, considered as an absolute in itself, negates its own concept, becoming the one without difference. That one, not (or in-) different, could be the cosmos itself, or the idea of logos, or each individual monad, which is the human subject – these are all forms of annulment of real difference, by annulment of relation. The difference, which constitutes the subjects, according to an anthropology in family matrix, is always a relational difference, as noted above.

On the other hand, the relation of which we speak is not merely an indeterminate flow of any global thing – like energy – that just runs terminals or nodes of an apparently different network. The relation so designed as flow or anonymous motion, becomes pure repetition of the same and not real difference. Family relationships, by contrast, are a different relationship model, which base of relation and identity is precisely that difference. The human, understood on this basis, is permanent relation of differences – or rather, of different persons (cf. Duque 2005).

If, in addition, we want to describe more precisely the primary way of this relationship of different persons, according to the family model, then we would come to their qualification as a donation (and corresponding reception). As such, the anthropological model proposed by this concept of family – and that can guide all human existence – is the conception of human relationship of different persons, according to the modality of the free gift. Societies in general have real and pragmatic difficulty in applying this anthropology, often limiting themselves to a policy of compromise. This does not invalidate that the deepest of human
orientation can – and should – be forward in this sense. Like Ricœur also said, when he spoke precisely about gratuitous love as a gift, “the tenacious incorporation, step by step, of a supplementary degree of compassion and generosity in all of our codes – including our penal codes and our codes of social justice – constitutes a perfectly reasonable task, however difficult and interminable it may be” (Ricœur 1996, 37).

2. To speak of “incorporation” leads us to another topic of the anthropology according to a family matrix and that is the place of the body. In an overly synthetic way, we could say that the western world has been living in the tension between a spiritualist anthropological matrix (generally considered gnostic) and an incarnational anthropological matrix. The application derived from the concept of family – as when one speaks of the human family, or of a certain community as a family – can suffer from Gnosticism, in that the foundation of this qualification is only one unifying idea, a certain “spirit” that all share (like a tribal totem). But an anthropology based on actual family relationships, cannot escape the corporeal incarnation of these relationships. In fact, all the relationships discussed above, although they cannot be reduced to its biological component, are inevitably based on that component. Thus, anthropology according to a family matrix is an incarnated anthropology, in which the flesh of each subject, as a place of the relation of the different, can never be undone gnostically in an idea or generic spirit, independently of its articulation as a personal body, as the body of a relationship. It’s as body that we are sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, wives and husbands, mothers and fathers. And when we transfer those relationships to other areas, we live it in the body. For so is the human condition.

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